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Cryptanalyses of A Two-factor User Authentication Scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks Zuowen Tan Advances in Information Sciences and Service Sciences. Volume 3, Number 4, May 2011 security flaws of Wong et al.'s scheme. However, Khan et al. [21] showed that M.L. Das's scheme is still not secure and vulnerable to gateway node bypassing attacks and privileged-insider attacks. Moreover, in the M.L. Das's scheme, the users cannot change/update their passwords and it does not provide mutual authentication between gateway node and sensor node. Khan et al. proposed improvements on M.L. Das's scheme. Their enhanced scheme overcomes the GW-node bypassing attack and provides mutual authentication between GW-node and sensor node. However, in this paper, we show that the Khan et al.'s scheme is still insecure and vulnerable to several attacks. Our cryptanalyses show that Khan et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attacks. In Khan et al.'s scheme, the GWN needs to store the user's identity, the user's verification information and the sensor node's verification information. Therefore, Khan et al.'s scheme suffers from the stolen verifier attacks. By applying the hash functions, we construct a new two-factor user authentication scheme in WSNs. Upon the assumptions of the existence of the collision resistant hash functions, the new scheme holds stronger security than some previous user authentication scheme in WSNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review and analyze Khan et al.'s scheme [21] . In Sections 3, we propose a new user authentication scheme in WSN. In Section 4, we analyze its security properties and performance. Finally, conclusion will be given in Section 5.
Review and analysis of Khan et al.'s scheme

Review of Khan et al.'s scheme
Here are the notations (listed in Table 1 .) which will be used throughout the paper. The other master secret of GWN Khan et al.'s scheme consists of four phases, i.e. the registration phase, the login phase, the verification phase, and the password change phase. The scheme is depicted as follows (also in Fig.1-4) .
(1) Registration phase The user U i registers to the WSN by operating the following steps.
Step R1. U i chooses a password PW i .
Step R2. U i ＝> GWN: ID i , h(PW i ).
Step R3.
where K is a symmetric key that is kept secret by the GWN.
Step R4. GWN＝> U i : a smart card which contains the parameters {h ( ), ID i , N i , h(PW i ),x a }, where x a is shared by the GWN and U i .
(2) Login phase The user U i invokes the phase by operating the following steps.
Step L1. U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and keys his identity ID i and password PW i .
Step L2. The smart card validates ID i and PW i with the stored values {ID i , h(PW i )}.
Step L3. The smart card computes
where T is the current timestamp of U i 's system.
Step L4. U i →GWN: Step V4.
If it holds,then GWN proceeds to the next step. Otherwise ,verification is terminated.
Step V6. Step V7. SN n computes B i =h(S n ||x s || T   ), where T   is the current timestamp of sensor node's system.
Step V8. SN n →GWN:
If it holds, then GWN proceeds to the next step.
Otherwise the authentication is terminated.
Step V10. If they are valid, the smart card sends a message which allows U i to change the password. Both U i and the smart card continues the following operations.
Step P1. The user chooses a new password PW i * and keys it into the smart card.
Step P2. The smart card computes N i Khan et al. showed that the M.L. Das-scheme suffers from GW-node by-passing attacks and insider attacks. Khan et al. point out that M.L. Das-scheme does not provide mutual authentication between GW-node and sensor nodes and is not equipped with changing passwords. Khan et al. propose an improvement to fix the aforementioned weaknesses of the M.L. Das-scheme. The authors claim that their scheme can overcome security flaws and provide robust two-factor user authentication in WSNs. However, in this section, we find that Khan et al.'s scheme cannot provide robust two-factor authentication and is vulnerable to password guessing attacks and stolen verifier attackers.
Weaknesses and drawbacks of Khan et al.'s scheme
(1) Password guessing attacks Consider the two-factor authentication. When a user is under attack, we also allow A to either compromise the password or the smart-card of the client under attack, but not both. Since Messerges et al. [22] and Kocher et al. [23] pointed out that all existing smart-cards cannot prevent the information stored in them from being extracted, for example, by monitoring their power consumptions, the security of smart card based authentication scheme is always discussed in the case where the smart card is stolen.
The adversary either can extract the information by obtaining the smart card or can get a user's password. The adversary cannot do both, or the adversary can login the server as a legitimate user. According to the requirement of two-factor authentication, we can assume that after an adversary (3) Accept the change (2) Check: Nevertheless, as the number of the registered users and the sensor nodes in the field becomes large, the GW-node must keep a list of the users (ID i , x a ) and a list of the sensor nodes (SN j , x s ) .
Therefore, Khan et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the stolen verifier attacks.
An improved scheme
In this section, we will propose an improved version of Khan et al.'s scheme. The GWN keeps two master keys x u and x sn . But the GWN does not need to maintain two lists, one of which stores each user's identity ID i and a secret value x a and the other of which stores each sensor's identity S n and a secret value x sn . The registration phase, the login phase, the verification phase, and the password change phase can be described as in the following (also in Fig.5-8 ). Step R1. U i chooses a password PW i .
Step R2. U i ＝>GWN: ID i , h(PW i ).
Step R3. The GWN computes N i =h(ID i ||h(PW i ))  h(ID i ||x u ).
Step R4. GWN＝>U i : a smart card which contains the parameters {h ( ), ID i , N i }. For each sensor node SN j in the WSN, the GWN stores h(S n ||x sn ) to SN n where S n denotes the identity of the sensor node SN n .
(2) Login phase The phase is invoked whenever the user U i requests to login the WSN. It is described as in the following.
Step L1. U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and enters the identity ID i and password PW i .
Step L2. The smart card computes
Step L3. U i →GWN:
Step V1. The GWN checks if (T * -T)≦ T  ,then GWN proceeds to the next step, otherwise verification is terminated. Here T  represents the expected time interval for the transmission delay.
Step V2. The GWN computes C i * =h(h(ID i || x u )||T), and checks if C i * =C i . If the equality holds, then GWN accepts the login request. Otherwise GWN rejects the login request.
Step V3. GWN computes A i =h(ID i ||C i || h(h(S n ||x sn )|| T )),where T  is the current timestamp of GWN's system.
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Step V4. GWN→SN n :
If it holds, then GWN proceeds to the next step. Otherwise verification is terminated.
Step V6. SN n computes A i * =h(ID i ||C i ||h(h(S n ||x sn )|| T  )) and checks if A i * =A i or not. If it holds, then SN n responds to U i 's query, otherwise terminates the operation.
Step V7. SN n computes B n =h(h(S n ||x sn )|| T   ), where T   is the current timestamp of sensor node's system.
Step V10. 
Analysis of the proposed scheme
We will show that our improved scheme has the security properties of Khan et al.'s scheme and remove the security defects of Khan et al.'s scheme.
Security analysis
Now, we will show that the improved scheme is secure against the GW-node bypassing attack, the privileged-insider attack, the password guessing attack and the stolen verifier attack. Moreover, the scheme can provide mutual authentication and sufficient scalability.
(1) Resistance to the GW-node bypassing attack In Khan et al.'s scheme, different users and sensor nodes share different secret parameters with GWN, respectively. The technique can avoid the GW-node bypassing attack. But it also makes the scheme suffer from the stolen verifier attack as shown in Section 2.2. Our proposed scheme does not use the technique. The GWN has two master secret keys x sn and x a . However, all the users and the sensor nodes donot share any of them with the GWN.
Assume a user U i or any adversary attempt to login a sensor SN n without going through the verification of GW-node. The malicious user U i or any adversary selects a fake ID k , chooses randomly C k and computes A k . Since A k =h(ID k ||C k ||h(h(S n ||x sn )|| T  )), without knowledge of h(S n ||x sn ), the probability of obtaining the valid A k is negligible.
(2) Resistance to the privileged-insider attack Our scheme can resist against privileged-insider attack. During the registration, each user U i only sends the hash value h(PW i ) of the password PW i instead of the plain text password PW i to the GW-node. Therefore, only the user U i himself know the secret password, which can protect from the possibility of privileged-insider attack (3) Resistance to the password guessing attack In the proposed scheme, the hash value of the password is not kept in the smart card. So the password guessing attack on Khan et al.'s scheme (shown in Section 3.1) will not work.
An adversary cannot also guess the password from the transmitted message {ID i , C i ,T}. Since the adversary does not know h(ID i ||x u ) , the adversary cannot obtain a verification function about the password from C i .
(4) Resistance to the stolen verifier attack In Khan et al.'s scheme, different users and sensor nodes share different secret parameters with GWN, respectively to avoid the GW-node bypassing attack. However, GWN must maintain two lists which store many pairs (ID i , x a ) and (SN j , x s ). In the improved scheme, the GWN use one single secret 
, only one who knows x sn or h(S n ||x sn ) can compute it. x u is kept secret by the GWN and h(ID i || x u ) is shared by the GWN and the sensor node SN j . If the adversary selects a fake ID k , chooses randomly C k and could compute a valid A k , this will contradict with the security of the hash function h(). Since A k =h(ID k ||C k ||h(h(S n ||x sn )|| T )), without knowledge of h(S n ||x sn ), the probability of obtaining the valid A k is negligible. Therefore, the sensor node SN j can authenticate the GWN through the message {ID i , C i , A i , T  } .
(6) Freedom of password change
The password can freely be updated by the smart card holder (a registered user U i ) at will without any interaction with the GW-node. The GW-node or the sensor nodes can be totally unaware of the password change.
(7) Sufficient scalability The WSN consists of thousands of sensor nodes. In the proposed scheme, WSN allows dynamic addition of new sensor nodes and new users. GWN holds the same two master keys and share the hash value of the master key and the identity of the new sensor nodes or new users. No verification list is kept by the GWN. When any sensor node is comprised or a user is corrupted, GWN can delete them without any change of the master keys. Revocation of misbehaving users or comprised sensor nodes is also easy.
Performance and functionality comparison
Due to the resource constraints of smart card, the password based smart card authentication scheme must take efficiency into consideration. In this section, we will evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme and make comparison with some authentication schemes [16] [21] [24] in sensor networks in Table 2 . By T h , we denote the time cost for one hash operation. Because exclusion-OR operation requires very few computations, its computational cost is usually neglected. In our scheme, the computational cost of registration phase, the login phase and verification phase is 3T h , 2T h and 5T h , respectively. Our scheme is more efficient than the schemes in [21] [24] . Although our scheme has the
